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Docker containers are an increasingly popular alternative for virtual machines, and they 
are widely used in small-scale and large-scale organizations alike. Containers are 
usually based on Linux distributions and vulnerabilities in these distributions affect all 
applications built upon these containers. The purpose of this study was to analyse the 
current security state of selected Linux distributions and provide insight about the 
overall security of Docker container usage. 
The goal of this study was to recognize what components and component versions were 
used in different OS distributions and how vulnerable these components were. The 
amounts and severities of vulnerabilities were compared between different OS 
distributions. Changes in critical and high severity vulnerabilities were compared 
between container distribution versions. The lifetimes and types of fixed critical and 
high severity vulnerabilities were determined. Along with Docker containers 
corresponding ISO distributions were analysed for comparison.  
Analysis of ISO and container distributions of Linux-based Debian, Ubuntu, and 
CentOS were conducted with Black Duck Binary Analysis (BDBA) software. BDBA is 
used to analyse the binary code of the distributions. Analysis results contain information 
about identified components, their versions, and vulnerabilities associated with them.  
As a result, Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS container distributions were considered 
secure. The observed container maintenance strategies differed between distributions: 
Debian and Ubuntu containers were updated periodically (approximately monthly), 
whereas CentOS container updates were tied to Linux ISO image updates - i.e., official 
releases. The number of critical vulnerabilities were low on all lately released 
containers. Fixed vulnerabilities between container releases varied a lot in age and 
severity. Even though containers are based on ISO distributions, different versions of 
same components were used in them making their vulnerability profile potentially 
different. In all distributions, software rotting was observed, and it is suggested that only 
latest versions of maintained distributions should be used, if there is no specific reason 
to not do so.  
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The purpose of this study was to give introduction to software security and 
cybersecurity field and terminology, and to analyse the current security state of selected 
Linux distributions and provide insight about the overall security of Docker container 
usage. Motivation for this topic was that Linux distributions and Docker containers are 
widely utilized in products and services ranging from e-commerce to medical devices 
and security issues of a single Linux distribution version can affect all software that 
relies on it.  
Prior research has been done to examine the security state of Linux packages and 
Docker containers as well as a variety of open-source software. Even though the results 
vary depending on the analysed software, used analysis methods, and the time of 
research, all lead to the same conclusion – Docker containers are affected by serious 
security issues. All the prior research focused on analysing large amounts of software. 
Even though some research focused on analysing only the latest container releases, not 
much data was available about the security state of actively maintained software. 
Research question of this study was what kind of vulnerabilities are identified in Linux 
distributions. Research methods consisted of literature review and quantitative research 
where data was gathered by analyzing Linux distribution versions and sets of 
observations were formed for comparison and critical analysis purposes. 
Main contribution of this study is the introduction to software security field and 
terminology provided with literature review and the overview to the current security 
state of selected Linux distributions provided with software composition analysis done 
with Black Duck Binary Analysis tool.  
Structure of the thesis is formed as follows. After introduction, the prior research related 
to this topic and the used research methods are presented in Prior research and Research 
methods parts, respectively. These are followed by the literature review and the research 
itself in the Study part. After the research is introduced, the results of made analyses are 
presented in the Findings part. Then the findings are compared to results of prior 
research and observations about the findings are made in the Discussion and 
implications part. After discussion, the main observations are presented in the 
Conclusions part. At the end of this thesis are reference list. Gathered and discussed 
data is presented in tables that are in Appendix A. 
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2. Prior research 
Large scale security vulnerability studies have been done to Docker images before with 
different analysis tools, such as Clair (Shu et al., 2017), Anchore (Liu et al., 2020) and 
Trivy (Prevasio, 2020). Shu et al. found that images contained more than 180 
vulnerabilities on average and more than 70 vulnerabilities on average for latest-tagged 
official images. More than 80 % of images have at least one high severity level 
vulnerability. It was also notable, that latest-tagged official images were updated in less 
than 14 days, but when looking at all the analysed images, 50 % had not been updated 
in previous 200 days and 30 % had not been updated in previous 400 days.  
Previous study of Linux package image security vulnerabilities is available (Falk & 
Henriksson, 2017), where 70 % of the images have at least one high severity level 
vulnerability and 54 % of the images have at least one critical severity level 
vulnerability. Authors also noted that official images can be not updated in several 
weeks or even months – and for public images this time can be years. 
Recently a study of over 2 million analysed Docker images was done by Liu et al. 
(2020) where 30 % of analysed latest-tagged official images were found to contain at 
least one critical or high severity level vulnerability. For community (non-official) 
images the corresponding number was 64 %, indicating that official images are better 
maintained than community images, but both suffer serious software vulnerabilities. In 
the same study the vital time of 334 CVE’s were analysed, and it was concluded that on 
average it takes 181 days for a vulnerability to be fixed in a common software - and 
additional 422 days (totalling to 603 days) for a vulnerability to be fixed in a Docker 
image. 
Recently the first analysis of all the 4 million container images available in Docker Hub 
was conducted by Prevasio (2020). Study found that 51 % of the analysed Linux 
container images had at least one critical vulnerability and 13 % had at least one high 
level vulnerability. 20 % of images were non-vulnerable. Same study discovered 6433 
malicious or possibly harmful images – that corresponds to 0,16 % of analysed Docker 
Hub images. While the percentage may look trivial, it possesses a viable threat as 
amounts of Docker Hub images and image downloads have been on a rise and Prevasio 
has estimated that Docker Hubs annual image downloads should top 100 billion on 
2020. 
Tak et al. (2018) discovered that more than 87 % of container images were based on 
Linux based distributions Debian, Alpine and Ubuntu. Fourth most popular operating 
system (OS) distribution was Linux based CentOS. Of the analysed 6589 Debian, 
Ubuntu, or CentOS images, 8 % contained no known vulnerabilities and on average 
image had 10,3 vulnerabilities while the median was 7 vulnerabilities per image. It was 
notable that different distributions had different vulnerability patterns: on average 
Ubuntu had 10,7 vulnerabilities (maximum 72 vulnerabilities), whereas Debian had 7,9 
(maximum 24) and CentOS 18,5 (maximum 116) vulnerabilities. While CentOS had 
most vulnerabilities, it also had most non-vulnerable images (30 %). This was 
hypothesised to be due to CentOS having longest time since last version update (during 
their study), giving time for vulnerabilities to accumulate while new ones are being 
discovered, but also having some well-cared images that are constantly updated.  
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Tak et al. (2018) also identified the most vulnerable packages for three Linux based 
distributions, Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS, at the time. For Debian, the top 3 was 
openssl, perl and sensible-utils, for Ubuntu libssl1.0.0, patch and libffi 6, and for 
CentOS libstdc++, libgcc and yum. 
In recent Open Source Security and Risk Analysis report (OSSRA report, Synopsys, 
2020b) 75 % of audited applications codebases contained vulnerabilities and 49 % of 
codebases contained high severity level vulnerabilities. It was also found that 91 % of 
codebases had components more than four years out of date or had no development 
activity in the last two years. Study was focused on codebases, not container images. 
Martin et al. (2018) have reviewed the state of container security ecosystem based on 
vulnerability analyses done by other researchers. Martin et al. present typical use-cases 
where detected vulnerabilities can be exploited and possible ways to mitigate 
vulnerabilities. 
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3. Research methods 
This study consisted of literature review and research parts. In the research part terms 
and phenomena introduced in literature part were observed in actual analysis done to 
open-source software. Utilized research methods were quantitative as gathered data was 
based on reliably repeatable measurements, such as amount of found critical 
vulnerabilities in specific Linux distribution version and sets of observations were 
formed for comparison and critical analysis purposes. 
The purpose of this study was to examine what kind of vulnerabilities are identified in 
Linux distributions. This research question could be further divided to following 
questions. 
RQ1: How the number of vulnerabilities change between Docker container versions?  
RQ2: What types of vulnerabilities are fixed between versions? 
RQ3: How vulnerabilities differ between desktop/server distribution versions and of the 
same Linux distribution? 
For this research, different Linux distribution versions had to be identified and 
downloaded before analyzing them with BDBA software. BDBA analysis resulted in a 
complete software bill of materials (BoM) – a list of third-party and open-source 
components with identified vulnerabilities associated with these components. Further 
data analysis of found vulnerabilities was done to compare the amount and severity of 
vulnerabilities between versions.  
BDBA analysis results were used to construct lists of components and vulnerabilities 
that are compared between versions. 
Limitations 
This Bachelor’s thesis was limited by the depth and width of the analysed Docker 
images: only Linux distribution was selected for this analysis and not all versions of it 
can be analysed due to the sheer number of available versions and limited time reserved 
for this work. For this work, the focus was on the lately released Linux-based Debian, 
Ubuntu, and CentOS distributions. Additionally, only part of the found vulnerabilities 
were chosen for further examination – giving focus only to critical vulnerabilities. 
Found vulnerabilities were limited to vulnerabilities found with BDBA software. My 
plan was to try to find and remove false positives reported by the tool as far as possible 
using publicly available data. 
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4. The study 
The literature review part provides an overview to software security of Linux-based 
open-source operating systems, followed by research part. First in the literature part free 
and open-source software is defined and their differences to common software products 
are introduced. Then, software security is explained with brief introduction to 
vulnerabilities, software analysis methods, and Black Duck Binary Analysis tool used in 
this thesis for analysing the security of Linux-based open-source operating systems. 
Lastly, a brief introduction for Linux-based open-source operating systems is provided. 
4.1 Free and open-source software 
Free and open-source software (FOSS) refers to software that is free to use, meaning 
that users are freely licenced to use, copy, study, change, improve and distribute the 
software, and its source code is openly shared. FOSS products may, or may not, be non-
commercial as the “free” in FOSS refers to freedom of the product, not the price, cost, 
or charge. (GNU, 2019.) 
FOSS enables building software products from existing packages or modules 
(“components”). Building new software from FOSS, or open-source software (OSS), 
components may decrease software development costs while increasing software 
security and stability as anyone can participate in component development, inspect the 
source code, and help find bugs and design flaws from the code. FOSS and OSS 
components are usually protected by licences which possible restrictions users must be 
aware of. (Opensource, 2021.) 
4.2 Software security and cybersecurity 
Software security can be defined as how well software is protected against malicious 
attacks and other threats while ensuring that the software continues to work correctly. 
Software security risks include bugs, buffer overflows, design flaws, malicious 
intruders, hackers, and improper digital handling. (Cyber Security Kings, 2020.) 
Software security and cybersecurity are partly overlapping terms and main difference 
between them is that software security can be seen to be connected to a specific device 
whereas cybersecurity is connected to whole internet or big data (Cyber Security Kings, 
2020). Most critical cybersecurity risks for web applications are called OWASP top 10 
and in 2017 they were injection attack, broken authentication, sensitive data exposure, 
XML external entities, broken access control, security misconfiguration, cross-site 
scripting XSS, insecure deserialization, using components with known vulnerabilities 
and insufficient logging and monitoring (OWASP, 2017). All security risks must be 
considered early in the software design and development to achieve a secure software. 
Writing secure software can be ensured either by secure programming – taking security 
aspects continuously into account while designing and writing program – or by late 
detection – doing security analyses to written program and fixing found security issues. 
(Sampaio & Garcia, 2016.) 
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One way to look at cybersecurity issues is to categorize them into Five Hard Problems 
of cybersecurity research: scalability and composability, policy-governed secure 
collaboration, security-metrics-driven evaluation, design, development and deployment, 
resilient architectures and understanding, and accounting for human behaviour. 
Combining these categories to the probability of security breach – how, where and when 
attack will occur, and if it does, how it can be detected – a risk value for each 
vulnerability can be calculated. (Scala et al., 2019.) 
Open-source software does not elude any OWASP top 10 cybersecurity risks, but in 
open-source projects, or any project recycling components, the risk of using 
components with known vulnerabilities should be specifically addressed. Being aware 
of possible known vulnerabilities affecting used components, users should first know 
what components and component versions their software contains. Knowing exactly 
what your software contains is not something to be taken as granted as projects are often 
developed by multiple users, not all is well documented, and used components may 
depend on other components that users may not consider when thinking of components 
comprising the developed software. (OWASP, 2021.) 
For comprehensive cybersecurity risk assessment, evaluating cybersecurity risks related 
to each individual component is not enough. According to scalability and composability 
problem of Five Hard Problems, the security of system itself, not its separate 
components, should always be top priority of cybersecurity assessment. If the whole 
system is not addressed in cybersecurity risk assessment, it is possible to mitigate 
security risks of certain components and simultaneously shift the threat to another 
component, or fix vulnerabilities of components, but simultaneously modifications of 
components may cause new vulnerabilities to the system. (Scala et al., 2019.) 
4.2.1 Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses, bugs, or design flaws, that compromise software 
security and can be exploited or triggered by threats (Computer Security Resource 
Center, 2020). Threats are intentional or accidental negative events that result in 
unwanted impact to a software or a system. Threat actors, such as hackers, intentionally 
trigger threat actions, but threats can be also triggered by insiders, authorized users, and 
natural disasters (Tunggal, 2020). Multiple software security tools are available both 
commercially and non-commercially that can be used to detect possible software 
security vulnerabilities affecting the analysed software products (OWASP, 2021). 
CVE 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a list of common identifiers for 
publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. CVEs, or CVE entries, are used as an 
industry standard for identifying unique software or firmware vulnerabilities. Using 
CVEs replaced company and tool specific security vulnerability databases and enabled 
discussion and sharing information about vulnerabilities, a baseline for tool evaluation, 
and automated data exchange as each vulnerability can be identified independently from 
the organization or tool used. (MITRE, 2020.) 
Identified vulnerabilities are given a unique CVE ID number in format CVE-year-
number sequence, for example, CVE-2020-28052, by CVE Numbering Authorities 
(CNAs). Every CVE also includes description of the vulnerability and at least one 
public reference. CVE is an international community effort, while being sponsored by 
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multiple federal organizations of USA, and free for public download and use. (MITRE, 
2020.) 
CVSS 
Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) is the current standard used to evaluate 
the severity and exploitability of vulnerabilities. Severity assets how much damage the 
vulnerability can cause to software or organization whereas exploitability assets how 
easy or probable it is to exploit the vulnerability. CVSS is governed by Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). Currently used version is 3.1 – 
although version 2 is also seen frequently as older vulnerabilities do not have the newer 
version 3.1 score. (Bhatt et al., 2020.) 
Both CVSS versions, 2 and 3.1, have several metrics that are used to calculate CVSS 
score that ranges from 0 to 10. Metrics can be divided into three categories: base 
metrics, temporal metrics, and environmental metrics. From these metrics, the base 
metrics are universal metrics whereas temporal and environmental metrics may be 
software or organization specific. As metrics between CVSS versions 2 and 3.1 are 
partly different, CVSS version 2 and version 3.1 scores cannot be compared directly. 
(Bhatt et al., 2020.) 
Base metrics determine the severity of the vulnerability and is used by National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) to rank vulnerabilities to severity categories. These 
categories are low (0.0 – 3.9), medium (4.0 – 6.9), and high (7.0 – 10.0) for CVSS 
version 2 scores and none (0.0), low (0.1 – 3.9), medium (4.0 – 6.9), high (7.0 – 8.9), 
and critical (9.0 – 10.0) for CVSS version 3.1 scores. Base score can be combined with 
temporal score to take into consideration availability of mitigations and environmental 
score to consider how widespread vulnerable systems are within an organization. (NVD, 
2020.) 
Vulnerability management 
Vulnerability management is a continuous process which lasts software’s whole 
lifecycle. Usually, the goal is to find out as many as possible vulnerabilities before 
releasing the software to customers. This can be achieved multiple ways, but most 
common is to test software before releasing it. Used tests are software and organization 
dependent. (Cavalancia, 2020.) Testing can be done to code itself, for example, with 
automated static analysis methods, or to the whole software, for example, with 
penetration testing (Austin et al., 2013).  
Vulnerability management is usually started within the organization, before releasing 
the product to the customers, but is then continued within and outside of the developing 
organization as new vulnerabilities are continuously discovered. Some testing methods, 
such as penetration testing, require specific expertise that most software developers and 
testers does not have, and these methods are commonly outsourced to other 
organizations. (Austin et al., 2013.) Software products that are commonly targeted by 
threat actors can also participate in bug-bounty programs, where external security 
researchers, also known as ethical hackers or white-hat hackers, try to find 
vulnerabilities from the software in exchange to monetary payments and public 
recognition (Zhao et al., 2017).  
After releasing it is also common for the software users, customer organizations, or 
ethical hackers to find bugs and vulnerabilities from the software and report them to the 
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software developing organization. Some open-source projects have even outsourced the 
whole bug hunting to users and other developers in the form of open bug reporting and 
tracking systems. (Zhao et al., 2017.) 
Software rotting 
As vulnerability discovery continues the whole lifetime of software, the older the 
software the more vulnerabilities it has accumulated if it has not been updated with 
newer versions or security patches. This phenomenon, where software has more and 
more security issues when code and software stay untouched, is known as software 
rotting. Software does not have more security issues as it gets older, but we are more 
aware of the security issues that it has always had. In some cases, changes in the 
environment where software is used may also expose software to more vulnerabilities or 
reveal vulnerabilities that were not identifiable in the original environment. (Georgescu, 
2020.) 
4.2.2 Software analysis methods 
Software analysis methods can be divided into two groups according to the timing of the 
analysis: static analysis is done to source code or compiled and executable code without 
executing it and dynamic analysis is done to program while it executes. Both method 
types include a variety of different types of techniques used, for example, static 
software analysis tools can help to visualize code, check for correctness (such as 
compilers doing type checking), or recognize inefficient or insecure parts of code. 
Similarly, dynamic software analysis tools can, for example, measure performance, 
identify bugs, or visualize execution. (Nethercote, 2004.)  
Other way to categorize software analysis methods is to divide them to source analysis 
methods and binary analysis methods. Source analysis methods use source-code for 
analysing software, whereas binary analysis methods use machine code, with or without 
statically linked object code, for analysis. Both method types can be utilized with static 
and dynamic analysis techniques. (Nethercote, 2004.) 
Almost all software analysis methods can be done both manually and automatically. 
Some techniques, such as type checking, are greatly enhanced by automating the 
process as manual utilization is very time consuming and is prone to human errors. 
Adversely, some techniques do not benefit greatly from automatization as they require a 
lot of upkeeping due to changes in software, or are prone to computer errors, for 
example, in cases where test executions are not deterministic. (Garousi & Mäntylä, 
2016.)  
Some techniques, such as penetration testing in which cyberattacks are simulated to 
identify possible security vulnerabilities are compatible with both manual and 
automated testing. Utilizing different approaches may result in better overall coverage 
for testing, as automated penetration tests are good for finding implementation bugs 
whereas manual penetration testing is good for identifying design flaws. (Austin et al., 
2013.) 
It has been argued that static analysis tools for automated code review are the most 
effective in identifying vulnerabilities in software (McGraw, 2008). However, when 
comparing automated static analysis with different types of penetration testing methods, 
it was noticed that different techniques recognized different types of vulnerabilities. 
Thus, relying to only one testing method or technique can leave many vulnerabilities 
14 
unnoticed. As all vulnerabilities should be removed from a system, regardless their 
nature or severity, it is advisable to combine multiple testing methods and techniques to 
identify vulnerabilities of the system. (Austin et al. 2013.) 
4.2.3 Black Duck Binary Analysis (BDBA) 
Black Duck Binary Analysis (BDBA) is a commercial software composition analysis 
(SCA) tool by Synopsys that provides crucial information about associated licenses, 
security vulnerabilities, and code quality risks. Unlike many of its competitors, BDBA 
analyses binary code, instead of source code, which enables scanning of virtually any 
software, if open source, commercial applications, firmware binaries and any software 
for which the source code is not publicly available. (Synopsys, 2020a.) 
BDBA, previously known as Protecode Supply Chain (Protecode SC) and 
Codenomicon Appcheck, uses a signature-based detection method to detect third-party 
libraries and their versions from software binaries and reports which licences and 
known vulnerabilities are associated with identified libraries. BDBA works on compiled 
binaries and supports multiple different programming languages, for example C/C++, 
C#, Java, and Go. In theory BDBA supports all compiled programming languages that 
are distributed as binary executables, but in practice formatting signatures for new 
programming languages requires a significant amount of research and development 
resources. For this reason, only the most common programming languages and 
executable formats are supported. (Kuuva, 2018.) 
BDBA fetches vulnerability data from NVD, utilizes CVEs to identify vulnerabilities, 
and classifies CVEs according to CVSS scores. BDBA utilizes automated static 
software analysis for binary code. (Kuuva, 2018.) 
4.3 Linux 
Linux is a common name for a family of Linux kernel based open-source operating 
systems. Linux-based systems are modular Unix-like operating systems that are usually 
packaged in Linux distributions. Linux distributions may be commercial, such as Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) and SUSE, or non-commercial, such as Debian, Ubuntu, 
Fedora and CentOS. Many Linux based distributions are community efforts and, being 
open-source software, they may share significant parts of their source-code. For 
example, Ubuntu is derived from Debian and CentOS is derived from RHEL. 
(Canonical, 2020; CentOS, 2020.) 
4.3.1 ISO images 
ISO image contains all the data from an optical disk, such as CD or DVD. As ISO 
images contains all the information required for the program, such as whole operating 
system, to assemble in a single file, ISO images are often used to distribute large 
programs via the internet. ISO files need to be opened and assembled to be able to use 
the programs that are transferred. ISO files can be also mounted to virtual machines so 
that they can be run like CD or DVD disks. (Fisher, 2021.)  Linux ISO images are 




Containers are a lightweight alternative for virtual machines. Both containers and virtual 
machines are used to emulate physical computers and are based on computer 
architectures. Their main difference is that whereas virtual machines all require their 
own copy of operating system (OS), containers may share the same OS kernel. When 
comparing virtual machines and containers, the lightweight containers have much 
smaller start-up times and require less resources for each image. (Kaur et al., 2017.) 
Containers are considered as standardized method for microservices deployment, used 
also by well-known large-scale companies such as Amazon, Spotify, Netflix, and 
Twitter (Soldani et al., 2018), but container security remains the main concern and 
adoption barrier for many companies (Sultan et al., 2019). 
Docker images 
Docker platform is widely used in software development as it provides fast and 
lightweight, container-based platform for developing, running, and shipping 
applications. It allows developers to work in standardized environments using local 
containers. These containers are based on Docker images – easily sharable, read-only 
templates with instructions for creating Docker containers. (Docker, 2020.) Docker Hub 
is used to share Docker images provided by software vendors, open-source projects, and 
community. One of the most popular Docker images are Linux distributions, such as 
Debian which has more than 500 million downloads on Docker Hub. (Docker Hub, 
2020.)  
Docker images contain almost solely Linux based OS distributions as over 97 % of top 
10000 public container images from Docker Hub contain Linux based OS (Tak et al. 
(2018). Vulnerabilities in Docker images usually affect all applications built using these 
images (Mohallel et al., 2016) and thus gaining information about the current security 
state of Linux distribution provides some insight about overall security of Docker image 
usage.  
4.4 Current research 
Latest Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS Linux distribution versions from years 2016 – 2020 
were downloaded from the official distribution sites manually. Amd64 DVD versions of 
available download files were selected for Debian and Ubuntu distributions. For 
CentOS, version corresponding to Amd64 DVD is x86_64, thus x86_64 was selected 
for CentOS distribution. Downloaded distribution versions are listed in Appendix A, 
Table 1.  
First available official releases and latest Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS Docker official 
container build versions from years 2016 – 2020 were downloaded from DockerHub via 
terminal and saved as Docker images for analysis.  
docker pull name:tag 
docker save -o name name:tag 
One Ubuntu container version from year 2015 was also included in the study as it still 
was under security maintenance. Downloaded Docker containers are listed in Appendix 
A, Table 2.  
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All container versions for year 2020 were downloaded and saved for selected 
distribution versions of CentOS (version 8), Debian (Buster) and Ubuntu (Bionic 
Beaver, Xenial Xerus). Selection criteria was that versions should be actively 
maintained. For Ubuntu versions, which had multiple maintained distributions unlike 
CentOS and Debian, Bionic Beaver and Xenial Xerus were selected as they were 
actively maintained and released before the beginning of 2020 – this dropped out Trusty 
Tahr, as it had reached the end of standard support, and both Groovy Gorilla and Focal 
Fossa, as they were released during 2020. Found vulnerabilities were counted for 
analysis date and container release date. For known vulnerabilities present during 
container release date, found vulnerabilities were filtered with vulnerability publishing 
date and all vulnerabilities that were published after container release were removed.  
Collected distribution and Docker container versions were analysed with BDBA 
software (scanner version 20201211) during two different sessions (16.12.2020 and 
14.1.2021). Due to new vulnerabilities being added to BDBA database continuously, 
newer BDBA analysis could have more matching vulnerabilities and vulnerable 
components. For each data table, vulnerability publishing dates were filtered according 
to the earliest analysis date used for data in that table, to ensure comparable data within 
data table. Due to this, care should be taken when comparing results from different 
tables.  
All vulnerability results are presented with NVD provided CVSS version 3.1 scores. 
Some vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2020-29362, may have been updated between 
analysis sessions and may cause minor errors in the data. CVE-2020-29362 CVSS 3.1 
scoring was updated from 9.1 to 5.3 and noticed when comparing critical vulnerabilities 
between container releases. CVSS 3.1 scoring of CVE-2020-29362 was fixed by hand 
to match updated information in results. 
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5. Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the research part of this thesis. Findings are 
divided to age of the analysed distribution versions, identified components, and 
vulnerabilities associated with identified components. 
5.1 Update time 
Analysed container distribution versions and their age during the analysis is presented in 
Appendix A, Table 2. For all the analysed latest containers, the average age was 300 
days. For maintained distributions, the average age of latest containers was 56 days (100 
days if security maintenance was included). In comparison, for unmaintained 
distributions the average age of latest containers was 477 days. It should be noted that 
the age of latest containers during analysis varied a lot – from 29 days of Debian Buster 
to 1261 days of Ubuntu Yakkety. For Debian and Ubuntu container releases the release 
dates are included in the container tag. 
All container releases for year 2020 was examined for maintained versions of CentOS 
(version 8), Debian (Buster) and Ubuntu (Bionic and Xenial). Results are presented in 
Appendix A, Table 2. Average time between new container releases were 163 days for 
CentOS, 24 days for Debian, 31 days for Ubuntu Bionic, and 29 days for Ubuntu 
Xenial. 
5.2 Found components 
Amounts of found components and vulnerable components from analysed container 
distributions were collected from the BDBA analysis results. Results are presented in 
Appendix A, Table 3. Average percentage of vulnerable components in all analysed 
containers were 22,9 % for Debian, 20,9 % for Ubuntu, and 23,7 % for CentOS. On 
average in the latest container releases there were 19,2 % vulnerable components in 
Debian containers, 19,5 % in Ubuntu containers, and 18,9 % in the latest CentOS 
container. In maintained Ubuntu distribution containers, the percentage was 15,2 %. 
Top 3 most vulnerable components are presented in Appendix A, Table 4. Vulnerability 
of component was determined by adding up found vulnerabilities (#vulns) from each 
latest distribution included in analysis. For example, the sum of vulnerabilities 
associated with berkeleydb was calculated adding up berkeleydb-associated 
vulnerabilities of latest Bullseye, Buster, Stretch, and Jessie containers. Number of 
found instances of the same component does not affect the sum of vulnerabilities. 
Number of identified versions does affect the sum of vulnerabilities – for example, in 
Appendix A, Table 4, total of 76 vulnerabilities from 4 different berkeleydb versions 
were found from latest Debian containers and total of 209 vulnerabilities from 11 
different berkeleydb versions were found from latest Ubuntu containers.  
For ISO distributions corresponding results are presented in Appendix A, Table 5. To be 
able to compare container vulnerable components with ISO vulnerable components, few 
distributions were selected for component matching analysis. ISO analysis results 
containing only components matching components found from containers are presented 
in Appendix A, Table 6.  
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Average percentage of all vulnerable components in ISO files were 10,3 % for Debian, 
14,8 % for Ubuntu (12,8 % for desktop distributions and 16,8 % for server 
distributions), and 22,3 % for CentOS. Analysis of only components matching container 
distributions resulted to 28,2 % vulnerable components in Debian Buster, 18,0 % in 
Ubuntu distributions (17,9 % in Groovy, 21,2 % in Bionic, and 14,9 % in Xenial), and 
16,9 % in CentOS 8.3.2011. Top 3 most vulnerable components in ISO distributions are 
presented in Appendix A, Table 7 and top 3 most vulnerable components that can be 
found from ISO distributions and containers alike are presented in Appendix A, Table 8. 
5.3 Found vulnerabilities 
Found vulnerabilities are examined according to the amounts of vulnerabilities affecting 
different component versions, lifetime of current critical or high severity level 
vulnerabilities, and accumulation of vulnerabilities as the distribution versions age. For 
the amounts of vulnerabilities, container and ISO distribution vulnerabilities are 
examined separately. 
5.3.1 Amount of container vulnerabilities 
Amounts of different severity vulnerabilities were collected for the analysed container 
distributions and results are presented in Appendix A, Table 9. Found vulnerabilities are 
grouped by CVSS version 3.1 scores. Critical vulnerabilities were found in 86 % of all 
analysed Debian containers, 62 % of all Ubuntu containers, and 100 % all CentOS 
containers. All analysed containers contained high severity level vulnerabilities. It 
should be noted that CentOS 8 containers contain approximately double the number of 
components than Debian Buster or Ubuntu Bionic and Xenial containers. 
Maintained latest container versions of Ubuntu had no containers with critical 
vulnerabilities whereas maintained latest container versions of Debian and CentOS both 
had critical vulnerabilities. Unreleased Debian container version (testing, currently 
Bullseye) had no critical vulnerabilities. Ubuntu container version with security 
maintenance (Trusty) had multiple critical vulnerabilities. 
On average latest Debian container versions had 60,5 vulnerabilities, of which 4,5 was 
critical vulnerabilities and 34,8 were high severity vulnerabilities. In comparison earlier 
Debian container versions (first available container versions of released distribution 
versions) had 111,7 vulnerabilities, of which 17,0 critical vulnerabilities and 51,3 high 
severity level vulnerabilities. 
For Ubuntu, the latest versions had on average 65,2 vulnerabilities, of which 6,5 were 
critical and 37,2 were high severity level vulnerabilities. Earlier Ubuntu versions had 
92,3 vulnerabilities, of which 11,6 were critical and 47,8 were high severity level 
vulnerabilities.  
5.3.2 Amount of ISO distribution vulnerabilities 
For ISO distributions corresponding results are presented in Appendix A, Table 10. 
Similarly to component results, selected vulnerability results are also matched to contain 
only components found in containers for better comparison. These results are shown in 
Appendix A, Table 11. All analysed ISO distributions were ‘latest’ available releases at 
the time of the study and were matched to the ‘latest’ available containers while 
downloading ISO distributions.  
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While looking at the total vulnerabilities found in ISO distributions, analysed Debian 
ISO distributions had an average of 2515,5 vulnerabilities, of which on average 199,3 
were critical and 890,0 were high severity level vulnerabilities. Analysed Ubuntu ISO 
distributions had an average of 2001,5 vulnerabilities (desktop distribution 1958,0 
vulnerabilities and server distribution 2044,9 vulnerabilities), of which 150,9 were 
critical and 713,9 were high severity level vulnerabilities. Similarly, analysed CentOS 
8.3.2011 ISO distribution had 354 vulnerabilities, of which 26 were critical and 130 
were high severity level vulnerabilities.  
For the matching vulnerabilities between ISO distributions and containers, the number 
of vulnerabilities found in Debian Buster was 54, of which 1 were critical and 38 high 
severity level during analysis, and in CentOS 8.3.2011 there was 83 vulnerabilities, of 
which 5 were critical and 46 were high severity level vulnerabilities during analysis. 
Average amount of vulnerabilities in Ubuntu distributions during analysis was 37,5, of 
which Groovy had 1 critical vulnerability, whereas Bionic and Xenial had 0 critical 
vulnerabilities, and on average they all had 26,5 high severity level vulnerabilities.  
5.3.3 Lifetime of vulnerabilities 
Lifetime of vulnerabilities was tracked in container releases of Ubuntu Buster, Ubuntu 
Bionic and Xenial, and CentOS 8 during year 2020. Results of analysis are presented in 
Appendix A, Table 12. Lifetime of a vulnerability was calculated subtracting the 
publishing date of vulnerability from the date of container version release in which the 
vulnerability is fixed. 
Goal was to identify critical vulnerabilities that were fixed during this time and 
calculate the time from finding of the vulnerability to fixing it, but it turned out that all 
critical vulnerabilities in Ubuntu containers were found after releasing the latest 
analysed container. Debian Buster had only one known vulnerability (CVE-2019-9893) 
during container releases, but it was not fixed during the observation period.  
CentOS containers released during year 2020 had three critical vulnerabilities that were 
fixed during observation period. These vulnerabilities are presented in Appendix A, 
Table 13 and their average lifetime is 311 days. Additionally, two critical vulnerabilities 
were identified (CVE-2020-27780 and CVE-2020-29362) that were published 
immediately after container release where they were fixed. 
Due to low number of critical vulnerabilities found and fixed during observation period, 
the goal was adjusted to identify critical or high severity level vulnerabilities that were 
fixed during observation period. Results are presented in Appendix A, Table 13. Debian 
Buster had 6 fixed high severity level vulnerabilities with average lifetime of 67 days. 
Ubuntu Bionic had 1 fixed high severity level vulnerabilities with lifetime of 646 days, 
Ubuntu Xenial no fixed high severity level vulnerabilities during observation period. 
CentOS had 18 fixed high severity level vulnerabilities with average lifetime of 419 
days (minimum 195 days, maximum 898 days). 
5.3.4 Software rotting 
Software rotting was observed in container releases of Ubuntu Buster, Ubuntu Bionic 
and Xenial, and CentOS 8 for one year period (year 2020). Vulnerabilities found during 
container releases are presented in Appendix A, Table 12, whereas vulnerabilities found 
from the same containers during analysis are presented in Appendix A, Table 14.  
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6. Discussion and implications 
The purpose of this study was to examine what kind of vulnerabilities are identified in 
Linux distributions. This question was further defined as (RQ1) how the number of 
vulnerabilities change between Docker container versions, (RQ2) what types of 
vulnerabilities are fixed between versions, and (RQ3) how vulnerabilities differ between 
different distribution versions. Additionally, collected data will be compared to previous 
research done to Linux distribution containers. 
6.1 Change in vulnerabilities between container versions 
First research question (RQ1) addressed the change in vulnerabilities between container 
versions. This question can be further divided to examination of how often new 
distribution versions are released and examination of changes in vulnerabilities between 
version releases. Changes in vulnerabilities between version releases can be divided to 
vulnerabilities that are fixed in the newer releases and vulnerabilities that are newly 
introduced in the newer releases. 
6.1.1 Update time 
According to the gathered data (Appendix A, Table 14), the availability of new 
container images is dependent on examined distribution: on average it was 24 days in 
Debian, 30 days in Ubuntu, and 163 days in CentOS. Large difference in average update 
times is probably caused by different approaches to container updates, as in CentOS 
container updates seemed to be tied to other version releases, meaning each version, 
such as 8.3, is released as an ISO distribution and as a container at approximately same 
time, whereas in Debian and Ubuntu container updates seemed to be more periodical 
(monthly) and not tied to point releases.  
In their study, Falk and Henriksson (2017) noted that official images may not have 
container updates in several weeks or even months. This is very vague expression, but 
as different distributions have very different approaches to container updates, this can 
be seen as appropriate depiction of the average update times. 
Average age of all analysed containers (Appendix A, Table 14) were 642 days – 318 for 
latest-tagged containers and 52 days for actively maintained latest-tagged containers. In 
their research Shu et al. (2017) concluded that most of latest-tagged official images, as 
also the analysed Linux distributions are, had been updated in less than 14 days, which 
is more often than what was observed with Debian, Ubuntu, or CentOS containers. 
Hence, we cannot confirm that conjecture from the data used in our study. 
6.1.2 Changes in vulnerabilities 
Appearance of critical and high severity level vulnerabilities were analyzed during year 
2020 in maintained containers (Appendix A, Table 12). As a result, no change in critical 
vulnerabilities were observed in Debian Buster, Ubuntu Bionic, and Ubuntu Buster 
containers. In CentOS 8, three critical vulnerabilities were fixed, and one new critical 
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vulnerability was found. For high severity level vulnerabilities, the corresponding 
numbers were in Debian Buster five vulnerabilities fixed and 11 new vulnerabilities 
found, in Ubuntu Bionic one fixed and two new vulnerabilities found, in Ubuntu Xenial 
zero fixed and two new vulnerabilities found, and in CentOS 8 21 fixed and 16 new 
high severity level vulnerabilities found. Fixed critical and high severity level 
vulnerabilities are presented in Appendix A, Table 13. 
It was also noted, that in CentOS 8, two critical level vulnerabilities were fixed right 
before vulnerabilities were published. It is assumed that publication of these 
vulnerabilities was intentionally postponed after release date of the fix to prevent 
exploitation of vulnerabilities.  
Additionally, it should be mentioned that used classification of vulnerability severities 
in this study is based on basic metrics of CVSS 3.1 scoring. Combining base score with 
temporal and environmental scores gives an organization specific CVSS score, which is 
more accurate description of the actual severity of the vulnerability. At least RHEL, 
which CentOS is based on, calculates organization specific CVSS scores for 
vulnerabilities affecting their products – it is presumable that CentOS relies more on 
these RHEL based CVSS scores than the base scores received from NVD. RHEL based 
CVSS scores of the five critical vulnerabilities found in CentOS 8.3.2011 container 
classifies only one of the vulnerabilities as critical. One of these vulnerabilities is 
considered to be of high severity, two of medium severity, and one of low severity. If 
CentOS relies on these organization specific scores, it is no wonder that these 
vulnerabilities have not been prioritized to be fixed as soon as possible. 
It can be concluded that containers with relatively short release cycle (new release once 
a month) had only few changes in vulnerabilities during the observation period, whereas 
containers with longer release cycle (release twice a year) had larger amounts of fixed 
and found vulnerabilities. It should be also noted that CentOS 8 containers contain 
approximately double the number of components than Debian Buster or Ubuntu Bionic 
and Xenial containers. Compared to that, Debian Buster had relatively more new 
vulnerabilities and relatively less fixed vulnerabilities than CentOS 8. 
6.2 Fixed vulnerabilities between versions 
Second research question (RQ2) concentrates on the vulnerabilities that are identified to 
be fixed between version releases. Firstly, how long vulnerabilities affect distributions 
on average is calculated. Then, the question of how the number of vulnerabilities 
change between container versions is addressed. Lastly, what are the types of 
vulnerabilities that are fixed between container versions is examined.  
6.2.1 Lifetime of fixed vulnerabilities 
The lifetimes of fixed vulnerabilities are presented in Appendix A, Table 13. On 
average, fixed critical vulnerabilities found during this study had a lifetime of 311 days 
and on average fixed high severity vulnerabilities had a slightly longer lifetime of 343 
days. High severity level vulnerability lifetimes varied from 41 days to 898 days. In 
their research, Liu et al. (2020) concluded that on average it takes 603 days for a 
vulnerability to be fixed in container – 422 days longer than making the fix in the non-
container version of the software. No such delay to fix vulnerabilities in containers was 
observed in our study. 
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Comparing the average lifetimes, looks like critical and high severity level 
vulnerabilities concerning examined Linux containers (Debian Buster, Ubuntu Bionic, 
Ubuntu Xenial, and CentOS 8) are more promptly fixed than vulnerabilities on average. 
As the severity level and selection criteria of vulnerabilities analysed by Liu et al. was 
not presented, it is difficult to assess how much CVSS scoring or affected distributions 
affect the lifetime of vulnerabilities.  
6.2.2 Software rotting 
For critical and high severity level vulnerabilities the changes in vulnerabilities between 
container versions has been mostly answered as a part of RQ1, but for all vulnerabilities 
the change in vulnerabilities after container releases are presented in Figure 1a. Change 
in vulnerabilities after container release was calculated by subtracting numbers of 
vulnerabilities found during container release (Appendix A, Table 12) from 
vulnerabilities found during container analysis (Appendix A, Table 14). Changes in 
only critical vulnerabilities were not visualised as the changes were minor in all 
observed containers during year 2020. As the number of components is different in all 
analysed distributions, accumulation of vulnerabilities was normalized by dividing the 
amount of found vulnerabilities with the number of components. Normalized results are 
presented in Figure 1b. 
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From the visualisation in Figure 1a, it is notable that different distributions accumulate 
vulnerabilities at different rates. This is most probably due to different maintenance 
strategies of containers as the size of the distributions does not seem to play major part 
when comparing normalized data (number of vulnerabilities per number of components) 
of different distributions in Figure 1b. The trend of accumulating vulnerabilities as 
containers gets older, or software rotting, is observed in all analysed containers. 
As Tak et al. (2018) discovered that the most popular Linux based container 
distributions were Debian, Alpine, Ubuntu, and CentOS, and clear majority of Linux 
based containers were based on them, keeping these distributions as secure as possible 
is of the utmost importance. Our study scope included Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS 
distributions. Alpine being the current second most popular Linux based container 
distribution, Alpine would be substantial addition for further research. If not separately 
taken care of, all vulnerabilities in these containers are also inherited to containers based 
on these distributions. Thus, our results can directly be applied to any container using 
those distributions as a base layer. As software rotting is a real issue, special care should 
be taken to regularly update used containers to latest versions to minimise the inherited 
security issues.  
6.2.3 Types of fixed vulnerabilities 
From the 28 fixed vulnerabilities identified during year 2020 (Appendix A, Table 13), 
all three critical vulnerabilities and two high severity level vulnerabilities were chosen 
for closer inspection. As all critical vulnerabilities affected CentOS 8 container 
distribution, high severity level vulnerabilities were chosen so that at least one 
vulnerability from each distribution version were inspected. Selected vulnerabilities 
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with their current National Vulnerability Database (NVD) descriptions and Common 
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) descriptions are presented in Appendix A, Table 15. 
Of the inspected vulnerabilities, three (CVE-2019-8457, CVE-2019-5482, and CVE-
2019-5481) were different types of memory buffer errors, one (CVE-2020-10878) was 
related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers, and one (CVE-2018-17953) 
was access control vulnerability. Improper access control vulnerability is the only one 
of these listed in OWASP top 10 web application security list. Improper access control 
is part of OWASP broken access control category. Exploitation of vulnerabilities 
affecting access control can lead to attackers gaining unauthorized access to software as 
a common user or administrator. This may lead to compromised data if attackers can 
create, access, update, or delete data as they wish. (OWASP, 2017) 
6.3 RQ3: Differences between distribution versions 
Last of the research questions (RQ3) addresses differences between different 
distribution versions, namely ISO distributions, that can be further divided to desktop 
and server versions in Ubuntu, and container distributions. Here differences have been 
measured as number of vulnerable components and number of found vulnerabilities. 
Containers are usually constructed using a small subset of components used in original 
ISO distributions. As ISO distributions have considerably larger number of components 
than containers have, for ISO distributions both the total and container matched 
numbers of vulnerable components were counted. Server versions of ISO distributions 
have usually fewer components than desktop versions, but these components may have 
significant differences. As all analysed ISO distributions were latest available versions, 
latest versions of containers are used as comparison. It should be noted that CentOS 8 
have a synced container and ISO distribution release, whereas in Debian and Ubuntu 
container releases are done more often than ISO distribution releases. 
6.3.1 ISO distributions vs container distributions 
When comparing container matching components found in ISO distributions with 
components found in latest-tagged containers, ISO distribution components were mostly 
more vulnerable than container components. Difference in vulnerable components 










































Debian and Ubuntu containers having less vulnerable components than ISO 
distributions could be due to analysed container releases being newer than ISO 
distributions and updated more often. Interestingly in CentOS, container distribution has 
more vulnerable components than ISO distribution. As container and ISO distribution 
releases are synchronized in CentOS, it is interesting that they have different number of 
vulnerable components, indicating that same versions of components were not used to 
compose different distribution versions of the same release at the same time.  
Comparison of all found vulnerabilities between container distributions and container 
matching components of ISO distributions are presented in Figure 3. When comparing 
critical vulnerabilities, only Ubuntu Groovy had different number of vulnerabilities in 
compared distributions - zero in container distribution and one in container matching 
components of ISO distribution. Difference in total vulnerabilities between compared 
ISO and container distributions were low - all distribution versions had close to no 
differences in the amounts of vulnerable components. Comparing component versions 
in both container distributions and container matching components of ISO distributions, 
we observed that container matching components of ISO distributions analysis results 
showed more versions of the same components than container analysis results. As also 
the versions used by containers were present, it seems that increase in vulnerabilities 
and vulnerable components is due to ISO distributions using multiple versions of the 
components. As ISO distributions may contain thousands of components, keeping all 
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Significant differences between number of vulnerabilities in compared container 
distributions and in container matching components of ISO distributions were observed 
only in Ubuntu Groovy distributions. In Ubuntu Groovy, the container matched 
components of ISO distribution had 32 % more vulnerabilities than the container 
distribution. This may be due to fact that Ubuntu Groovy was first released significantly 
later than other distributions - late 2020 compared to Debian Buster and CentOS 8 
released originally in 2019 and other Ubuntu distributions being even older than that.  
Difference of total vulnerabilities between CentOS 8 distributions and other 
distributions is in line with the difference of number of total components in 
distributions. 
Liu et al. (2020) calculated that on average it took 422 days longer for a vulnerability to 
be fixed in a container compared to common software. In Debian, Ubuntu, or CentOS 
no clear delay between fixing a vulnerability in ISO distributions and container 
distributions was observed.  This hints at distributions treating common software and 
container with same priority. 
6.3.2 Vulnerabilities in containers compared to prior research 
In prior studies the average number of found vulnerabilities vary a lot. This is probably 
due to different container distributions being selected for the analysis and usage of 
different analysis tools to gather data.  
Shu et al. (2017) discovered that latest-tagged containers (not necessarily Linux-based) 
had on average more than 70 vulnerabilities, whereas Tak et al. (2018) calculated that 
analysed Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS containers had an average of 10,3 vulnerabilities. 
Average amount of vulnerabilities found in all latest containers (Appendix A, Table 9) 
is 65,3 vulnerabilities (on average 44,2 vulnerabilities, if only maintained latest 
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containers are considered), which is significantly higher than the average presented by 
Tak et al. and close to the average presented by Shu et al. It is difficult to say whether 
the difference comes from the selection of containers to analyse or the analysis method 
itself.  
In their study Tak et al. (2018) observed that different analysed distributions, Debian, 
Ubuntu, and CentOS, had different vulnerability patterns - on average Debian had 7,9 
(maximum 24), Ubuntu had 10,7 vulnerabilities (maximum 72), and CentOS 18,5 
(maximum 116) vulnerabilities. Similarly, different patterns can be seen in containers 
analysed with BDBA (Appendix A, Table 9) – also here Debian had lowest number of 
vulnerabilities (on average 60,5 for latest containers), followed closely by Ubuntu (on 
average 65,2 vulnerabilities), and CentOS had most vulnerabilities (85 vulnerabilities). 
While Tak et al. hypothesised that CentOS had most vulnerabilities due to it having 
longest time since container update, allowing time for software rotting, now collected 
analysis data refutes this analysis as CentOS was the most vulnerable of the containers 
but now it was also the most recent container to be added to Docker Hub. 
Other often used indicator for recognizing vulnerable containers in literature was 
portion of containers having at least one critical or high severity level vulnerability. Falk 
and Henriksson (2017) reported that 54% of containers in their analysis had at least one 
critical vulnerability and 70 % had at least one high severity level vulnerability, whereas 
corresponding numbers in study by Prevasio (2020) were 51 % for critical 
vulnerabilities and 64 % for high severity level vulnerabilities. Both studies were done 
by analysing Linux containers, but not limiting the analysis to Debian, Ubuntu, and 
CentOS distributions. Now collected data resulted in 70 % of containers having at least 
one critical vulnerability and all analysed containers having high severity level 
vulnerabilities. Prevasio also reported that 20 % of containers were non-vulnerable – in 
BDBA analysis, non-vulnerable containers were not found. As with the numbers of 
vulnerabilities found, it is difficult to say whether the difference comes from the 
selection of containers to analysis or the analysis method itself – probably it is a 
combination of both. 
In their prior research Tak et al. (2018) discovered that most vulnerable components of 
Debian container distributions were openssl, perl and sensible-utils. None of these 
components are in current Debian container top 3 vulnerable components. Openssl was 
now 21st and perl was 13th most vulnerable component. Sensible-utils was found from 
Debian containers but contained no known vulnerabilities. 
Most vulnerable components of Ubuntu container distributions were libssl11.0.0, patch, 
and libffi 6 (Tak et al. 2018). None of these components are in current Ubuntu container 
top 3 vulnerable components. Libssl, also known as openssl, was now 35th most 
vulnerable component of Ubuntu containers. Patch was not found at all from Ubuntu 
containers whereas libffi was found but did not contain any known vulnerabilities.  
Most vulnerable components of CentOS container distributions were libstdc++, libgcc 
and yum (Tak et al. 2018). None of these components are in current CentOS container 
top 3 vulnerable components. Libstdc++ and libgcc were both found under the name 
gcc. Gcc contained no known vulnerabilities. Yum has been rewritten as DNF package 
manager and it contains no known vulnerabilities. 
6.3.3 Server distributions vs desktop distributions 
Ubuntu ISO distributions had separate versions for desktop ISO distributions and server 
ISO distributions. Comparison of components found from each version revealed that on 
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average desktop versions had 596 (41,5 %) more components than server distributions 
(Appendix A, Table 5). However, this varied a lot as at largest the difference was 803 
components and at the smallest 78 components.  
Top 3 most vulnerable components of Ubuntu server distributions were linux_kernel, 
mysql, and imagemagick, and for Ubuntu desktop distributions the top 3 was 
linux_kernel, thunderbird, and binutils. In desktop distributions imagemagick was 4th 
most vulnerable component and mysql was 14th most vulnerable component. In server 
distributions thunderbird was not used at all and binutils was 8th most vulnerable 
component. All compared components, linux_kernel, imagemagick, mysql, and binutils, 
also had different number of recognized versions and found vulnerabilities – for 
example, in all ubuntu ISO desktop distributions 18 different versions of linux_kernel 
with a total of 8073 vulnerabilities were found, whereas in all ubuntu ISO server 
distributions 26 different linux_kernel versions with a total of 9220 vulnerabilities were 
found. It can be concluded that server and desktop distributions are using different 
versions of these components. 
When comparing number of vulnerabilities in these distributions, on average server 
distributions had 2045 vulnerabilities (min 768, max 4894) and desktop distributions 
had 1958 vulnerabilities (min 676, max 3918) (Appendix A, Table 10). This was 
surprising as on average server distributions contain considerably less components than 
desktop distributions, indicating that the components and component versions used in 
server distributions are on average significantly more vulnerable than the components 
and versions used in desktop distributions. It is also possible that finding vulnerabilities 
in server distributions is considered more critical than finding vulnerabilities on desktop 
distributions and at least part of the difference is caused by more rigorous testing. 
Interestingly the number of found critical vulnerabilities was smaller in server 
distributions, where on average 139 critical vulnerabilities were identified (min 42, max 
331), than in desktop distributions, where on average 163 critical vulnerabilities were 
identified (min 40, max 426). Same trend can be also seen in the number of found high 
severity level vulnerabilities, where server distributions had 695 vulnerabilities and 
desktop distributions had 732 vulnerabilities on average. This suggests that even though 
server distributions have more total vulnerabilities on average, they are still cared 
relatively well compared to desktop distributions. It should be noted that these numbers 
contain all the latest releases of ISO distributions from year 2016 to 2020 and most of 
these distributions are not maintained anymore. 
29 
7. Conclusions 
In this study, different ISO and container distributions of three Linux-based 
distributions, Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS, are identified, downloaded, and analysed. 
Analysis is done with BDBA software provided by Synopsys. BDBA uses the binary 
code of analysed products to identify what components are used in the distributions and 
what vulnerabilities are affecting the identified components. Information about the 
vulnerable components and found vulnerabilities is collected from the BDBA analysis 
results and used to construct lists presented in this study. The purpose of this study is to 
examine what kind of vulnerabilities are identified in analysed distributions. Also, the 
number of vulnerable components and found vulnerabilities are compared between 
different distribution types as well as to prior research.  
As a result, the current security status of maintained Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS ISO 
and container distributions can be established and compared between distributions. As is 
expected due to the significant size difference of ISO and container distributions, ISO 
and container distributions cannot be reasonably compared. Thus, comparison is done 
between container distributions and the part of ISO distribution components, that are 
also found in comparable containers. Conclusion after comparison is that different 
versions of same components are used in ISO distributions and container distributions. 
While the number of vulnerable components differ between ISO and container 
distributions, no significant difference in the number or severity of found vulnerabilities 
is observed. Different vulnerabilities may affect comparable components of ISO and 
container distributions, but the overall security status is similar in both. When 
comparing whole ISO distributions to container distributions, maintained containers are 
considerably more secure than latest ISO distributions. 
Analysis of maintained distributions released during year 2020 reveals that maintained 
Debian, Ubuntu, and CentOS containers are relatively well cared after. Debian and 
Ubuntu containers are updated periodically (approximately monthly), whereas CentOS 
container updates are tied to Linux ISO image updates - i.e., official releases. Low 
numbers of critical and high severity level vulnerabilities are observed in Debian and 
Ubuntu distributions and these can be considered very secure. CentOS has more 
components than other distributions and correspondingly it also has more 
vulnerabilities. Most of the critical vulnerabilities found in latest CentOS container are 
classified as non-critical by RHEL, which CentOS is based on. This suggests that also 
CentOS can be considered very secure as the identified critical vulnerabilities may not 
be applicable in CentOS products. 
Comparison of maintained and un-maintained distributions confirms that un-maintained 
distributions, may they be ISOs or containers, are significantly more vulnerable than 
maintained distributions. Software rotting is observed in all analysed containers. 
As a conclusion, maintained Debian and Ubuntu container distributions are more secure 
and more regularly updated than CentOS container distribution. No matter which 
distribution is selected, it is at utmost importance to keep used containers updated, 
always pull latest-tagged containers if there is no specific reason to not do so and 
rebuild containers periodically. This is especially important for widely used Linux-
based distributions as vulnerabilities in these containers are usually inherited to 
containers build on them. 
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Appendix A. Data tables 
Table 1 
Downloaded and Analysed ISO Distributions 
  Distribution release version Alternative names Latest release Notes 
Debian       
  10.6.0 Buster, stable 26.9.2020 Maintained 
  9.13.0 Stretch, oldstable 18.7.2020 Unmaintained 
  8.11.1 Jessie, oldoldstable 23.6.2018 Unmaintained 
  bullseye-DI-alpha2 Bullseye, testing 16.3.2020 Not released 
Ubuntu       
  20.10-desktop Groovy Gorilla 22.10.2020 Maintained 
  20.10-live-server     Maintained 
  20.04.1-desktop Focal Fossa 6.8.2020 Maintained 
  20.04.1-live-server     Maintained 
  19.10-desktop Eoan Ermine 17.10.2019 Unmaintained 
  19.10-live-server     Unmaintained 
  19.04-desktop Disco Dingo 18.4.2019 Unmaintained 
  19.04-live-server     Unmaintained 
  18.10-desktop Cosmic Cuttlefish 18.10.2018 Unmaintained 
  18.10-live-server     Unmaintained 
  18.04.5-desktop Bionic Beaver 13.8.2020 Maintained 
  18.04.5-live-server     Maintained 
  17.10.1-desktop Artful Aardvark 19.10.2017 Unmaintained 
  17.10.1-server     Unmaintained 
  17.04-desktop Zesty Zapus 13.4.2017 Unmaintained 
  17.04-server     Unmaintained 
  16.10-desktop Yakkety Yak 13.10.2016 Unmaintained 
  16.10-server     Unmaintained 
  16.04.7-desktop Xenial Xerus 13.8.2020 Maintained 
  16.04.7-server     Maintained 
CentOS       





Downloaded and Analysed Container Distributions 
  Distribution release version Notes 
Debian   
  debian:buster-20201209   
  debian:buster-20201117 'latest' during download 
  debian:buster-20201012   
  debian:buster-20200908   
  debian:buster-20200803   
  debian:buster-20200720   
  debian:buster-20200607   
  debian:buster-20200514   
  debian:buster-20200511   
  debian:buster-20200422   
  debian:buster-20200414   
  debian:buster-20200327   
  debian:buster-20200224   
  debian:buster-20200130   
  debian:buster-20190708 First official release 
  debian:stretch-20201117 'latest' 
  debian:stretch-20170620 Earliest available 
  debian:jessie-20201117 'latest' 
  debian:jessie-20170606 Earliest available 
  debian:bullseye-20201117 'latest' 
Ubuntu   
  ubuntu:groovy-20201022.1 'latest' 
  ubuntu:focal-20201008 'latest' 
  ubuntu:focal-20200423 First official release 
  ubuntu:eoan-20200608 'latest' 
  ubuntu:eoan-20191017 First official release 
  ubuntu:disco-20200114 'latest' 
  ubuntu:disco-20190423 First official release 
  ubuntu:cosmic-20190719 'latest' 
  ubuntu:cosmic-20181018 First official release 
  ubuntu:bionic-20201119   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200921 'latest' during download 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200903   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200807   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200713   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200630   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200526   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200403   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200311   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200219   
  ubuntu:bionic-20200112   
  ubuntu:bionic-20180426 First official release 
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  Distribution release version Notes 
  ubuntu:artful-20180706 'latest' 
  ubuntu:artful-20171019 First official release 
  ubuntu:zesty-20171122 'latest' 
  ubuntu:zesty-20170517.1 First official release 
  ubuntu:yakkety-20170704 'latest' 
  ubuntu:yakkety-20161013 First official release 
  ubuntu:xenial-20201030   
  ubuntu:xenial-20201014 'latest' during download 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200916   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200903   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200807   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200706   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200619   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200514   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200326   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200212   
  ubuntu:xenial-20200114   
  ubuntu:xenial-20160422 First official release 
  ubuntu:trusty-20191217 'latest' 
  ubuntu:trusty-20150427 First official release 
CentOS   
  centos:centos8.3.2011 'latest' 
  centos:centos8.2.2004   





Found Vulnerable Components in Container Distributions 
  Distribution release version Components 
  Total Vulnerable % vulnerable 
Debian       
  debian:buster-20201117 71 18 25,4 
  debian:buster-20190708 70 19 27,1 
  debian:stretch-20201117 64 15 23,4 
  debian:stretch-20170620 64 20 31,3 
  debian:jessie-20201117 87 17 19,5 
  debian:jessie-20170606 80 20 25,0 
  debian:bullseye-20201117 84 7 8,3 
Ubuntu       
  ubuntu:groovy-20201022.1 78 9 11,5 
  ubuntu:focal-20201008 72 8 11,1 
  ubuntu:focal-20200423 71 7 9,9 
  ubuntu:eoan-20200608 70 10 14,3 
  ubuntu:eoan-20191017 69 11 15,9 
  ubuntu:disco-20200114 69 15 21,7 
  ubuntu:disco-20190423 68 17 25,0 
  ubuntu:cosmic-20190719 66 15 22,7 
  ubuntu:cosmic-20181018 66 16 24,2 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200921 66 13 19,7 
  ubuntu:bionic-20180426 66 16 24,2 
  ubuntu:artful-20180706 69 18 26,1 
  ubuntu:artful-20171019 69 18 26,1 
  ubuntu:zesty-20171122 64 17 26,6 
  ubuntu:zesty-20170517.1 64 17 26,6 
  ubuntu:yakkety-20170704 64 18 28,1 
  ubuntu:yakkety-20161013 64 18 28,1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20201014 74 11 14,9 
  ubuntu:xenial-20160422 75 16 21,3 
  ubuntu:trusty-20191217 159 28 17,6 
  ubuntu:trusty-20150427 144 34 23,6 
CentOS       
  centos:centos8.3.2011 148 28 18,9 





Top 3 Most Vulnerable Components in Containers 
#vulns Debian #vulns Ubuntu #vulns CentOS 
76 berkeleydb 209 berkeleydb 19 berkeleydb 
56 glibc 116 glibc 17 binutils 




Found Vulnerable Components in ISO Distributions 
  Distribution release version All components 
  Total Vulnerable % vulnerable 
Debian       
  10.6.0 3152 257 8,2 
  9.13.0 3143 339 10,8 
  8.11.1 2621 399 15,2 
  bullseye-DI-alpha2 3243 229 7,1 
Ubuntu       
  20.10-desktop 1535 114 7,4 
  20.10-live-server 698 81 11,6 
  20.04.1-desktop 1542 139 9,0 
  20.04.1-live-server 687 93 13,5 
  19.10-desktop 1567 189 12,1 
  19.10-live-server 669 114 17,0 
  19.04-desktop 1581 236 14,9 
  19.04-live-server 743 153 20,6 
  18.10-desktop 1494 242 16,2 
  18.10-live-server 732 156 21,3 
  18.04.5-desktop 1338 133 9,9 
  18.04.5-live-server 535 84 15,7 
  17.10.1-desktop 1228 192 15,6 
  17.10.1-server 1150 210 18,3 
  17.04-desktop 1373 219 16,0 
  17.04-server 1074 201 18,7 
  16.10-desktop 1380 231 16,7 
  16.10-server 1066 208 19,5 
  16.04.7-desktop 1320 137 10,4 
  16.04.7-server 1048 121 11,5 
CentOS       





ISO Distribution Components That Are Also Present in Corresponding Containers 
  Distribution release version Components 
  Total Vulnerable % vulnerable 
Debian       
  10.6.0 71 20 28,2 
Ubuntu       
  20.10-desktop 78 13 16,7 
  20.10-live-server 78 15 19,2 
  18.04.5-desktop 66 14 21,2 
  18.04.5-live-server 66 14 21,2 
  16.04.7-desktop 74 11 14,9 
  16.04.7-server 74 11 14,9 
CentOS       




Top 3 Most Vulnerable Components in ISO Distributions 
#vulns Debian #vulns Ubuntu #vulns CentOS 
1468 linux_kernel 16754 linux_kernel 175 linux_kernel 
876 mysql 2280 mysql 23 binutils 




Top 3 Most Vulnerable Components in ISO Distributions That Are Also Present in 
Corresponding Containers 
#vulns Debian #vulns Ubuntu #vulns CentOS 
115 glibc 994 openssl 23 binutils 
95 berkeleydb 668 sqlite3 19 berkeleydb 




Found Vulnerabilities in Container Distributions 
  Distribution release version Vulnerabilities 
  Total Critical High Medium Low None 
Missing CVSS3.1 
classification 
Debian               
  debian:buster-20201117 53 1 37 11 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20190708 59 2 40 14 3 0 0 
  debian:stretch-20201117 76 5 36 31 3 0 1 
  debian:stretch-20170620 131 23 56 47 4 0 1 
  debian:jessie-20201117 88 12 44 28 2 0 2 
  debian:jessie-20170606 145 26 58 56 3 0 2 
  debian:bullseye-20201117 25 0 22 2 1 0 0 
Ubuntu               
  ubuntu:groovy-20201022.1 28 0 24 3 1 0 0 
  ubuntu:focal-20201008 27 0 25 2 0 0 0 
  ubuntu:focal-20200423 27 0 24 3 0 0 0 
  ubuntu:eoan-20200608 30 0 25 5 0 0 0 
  ubuntu:eoan-20191017 31 0 26 5 0 0 0 
  ubuntu:disco-20200114 45 0 35 9 1 0 0 
  ubuntu:disco-20190423 49 3 35 10 1 0 0 
  ubuntu:cosmic-20190719 53 2 36 13 2 0 0 
  ubuntu:cosmic-20181018 67 7 40 16 4 0 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200921 36 0 25 9 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20180426 46 5 28 11 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:artful-20180706 95 12 45 34 3 0 1 
  ubuntu:artful-20171019 97 12 46 35 3 0 1 
  ubuntu:zesty-20171122 126 22 57 41 4 0 2 
  ubuntu:zesty-20170517.1 127 22 58 41 4 0 2 
  ubuntu:yakkety-20170704 132 22 60 42 4 0 4 
  ubuntu:yakkety-20161013 133 21 60 44 4 0 4 
  ubuntu:xenial-20201014 36 0 25 9 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20160422 51 6 29 14 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:trusty-20191217 109 13 52 33 2 0 9 
  ubuntu:trusty-20150427 295 40 132 92 7 0 24 
CentOS               
  centos:centos8.3.2011 85 5 46 33 0 0 1 





Found Vulnerabilities in ISO Distributions 
  Distribution release version Vulnerabilities 
  
Total Critical High Medium Low None 
Missing CVSS3.1 
classification 
Debian               
  10.6.0 1481 92 425 621 96 0 247 
  9.13.0 2516 190 946 1212 84 0 84 
  8.11.1 4485 432 1763 1942 136 0 212 
  bullseye-DI-alpha2 1580 83 426 705 137 0 229 
Ubuntu               
  20.10-desktop 816 44 318 365 22 0 67 
  20.10-live-server 768 42 296 349 25 0 56 
  20.04.1-desktop 1110 53 419 522 28 0 88 
  20.04.1-live-server 935 50 348 439 38 0 60 
  19.10-desktop 1685 87 598 873 58 0 69 
  19.10-live-server 1341 78 493 659 52 0 59 
  19.04-desktop 1875 147 686 875 60 0 107 
  19.04-live-server 1077 102 421 453 38 0 63 
  18.10-desktop 1757 184 632 811 74 0 56 
  18.10-live-server 1171 118 456 512 48 0 37 
  18.04.5-desktop 676 40 249 291 35 0 61 
  18.04.5-live-server 771 49 297 360 26 0 39 
  17.10.1-desktop 2801 222 1001 1445 89 0 44 
  17.10.1-server 4894 276 1561 2793 220 0 44 
  17-04-desktop 3599 341 1419 1694 94 0 51 
  17.04-server 3701 257 1205 2023 178 0 38 
  16.10-desktop 3918 426 1487 1795 93 0 117 
  16.10-server 4141 331 1285 2228 187 0 110 
  16.04.7-desktop 1343 89 515 645 47 0 47 
  16.04.7-server 1650 82 592 862 68 0 46 
CentOS               





Found Container Matching Vulnerabilities in ISO Distributions 
  Distribution release version Vulnerabilities 
  
Total Critical High Medium Low None 
Missing CVSS3.1 
classification 
Debian               
  10.6.0 54 1 38 11 3 0 1 
Ubuntu               
  20.10-desktop 35 1 27 5 1 0 1 
  20.10-live-server 38 1 28 7 1 0 1 
  18.04.5-desktop 40 0 27 10 1 0 2 
  18.04.5-live-server 40 0 27 10 1 0 2 
  16.04.7-desktop 36 0 25 9 1 0 1 
  16.04.7-server 36 0 25 9 1 0 1 
CentOS               




Found Vulnerabilities in Maintained Containers During Container Releases 
  Distribution release 
version 
Vulnerabilities during container release 




Debian 10               
  debian:buster-20201209 47 1 35 9 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20201117 47 1 35 9 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20201012 47 1 35 9 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200908 47 1 35 9 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200803 46 1 34 9 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200720 54 1 39 12 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200607 52 1 38 11 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200514 42 1 33 6 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200511 42 1 33 6 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200422 42 1 33 6 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200414 41 1 32 6 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200327 39 1 30 6 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200224 37 1 29 5 2 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200130 37 1 29 5 2 0 0 
Ubuntu 18.04               
  ubuntu:bionic-20201119 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200921 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200903 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200807 35 0 26 8 0 1 0 
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  Distribution release 
version 
Vulnerabilities during container release 




  ubuntu:bionic-20200713 35 0 26 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200630 35 0 26 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200526 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200403 33 0 25 7 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200311 32 0 24 7 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200219 32 0 24 7 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200112 32 0 24 7 0 1 0 
Ubuntu 16.04               
  ubuntu:xenial-20201030 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20201014 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200916 34 0 25 8 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200903 35 0 25 9 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200807 35 0 25 9 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200706 35 0 25 9 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200619 35 0 25 9 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200514 32 0 24 7 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200326 31 0 23 7 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200212 31 0 23 7 0 1 0 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200114 31 0 23 7 0 1 0 
CentOS 8               
  centos:centos8.3.2011 75 5 43 26 0 1 0 
  centos:centos8.2.2004 87 4 48 33 1 1 0 





Lifetimes of Vulnerabilities 
  CVE CVSS3 
Lifetime 
(days) 
Debian Buster     
  CVE-2020-10878 8.6 59 
  CVE-2020-10543 8.2 59 
  CVE-2020-1712 7.8 41 
  CVE-2020-12723 7.5 59 
  CVE-2020-13777 7.4 60 
  CVE-2020-11501 7.4 122 
Ubuntu Bionic     
  CVE-2018-17953 8.1 646 
CentOS 8     
  CVE-2019-8457 9.8 384 
  CVE-2019-5482 9.8 275 
  CVE-2019-5481 9.8 275 
  CVE-2018-1000858 8.8 719 
  CVE-2019-5018 8.1 578 
  CVE-2019-3844 7.8 418 
  CVE-2019-3843 7.8 418 
  CVE-2019-5436 7.8 386 
  CVE-2020-13110 7.8 206 
  CVE-2018-14404 7.5 699 
  CVE-2019-15847 7.5 289 
  CVE-2019-16056 7.5 285 
  CVE-2019-20454 7.5 298 
  CVE-2019-19956 7.5 350 
  CVE-2019-19906 7.5 355 
  CVE-2019-15903 7.5 461 
  CVE-2019-13050 7.5 528 
  CVE-2018-20843 7.5 898 
  CVE-2020-13630 7.0 195 
  CVE-2020-1752 7.0 222 











Vulnerabilities during container analysis 




Debian 10                 
  debian:buster-20201209 33 52 1 38 10 3 0 0 
  debian:buster-20201117 55 53 1 38 11 3 0 0 
  debian:buster-20201012 91 57 1 40 12 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200908 125 57 1 40 12 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200803 161 57 1 40 12 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200720 175 65 1 45 15 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200607 218 65 1 45 15 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200514 242 61 1 44 12 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200511 245 62 1 44 13 4 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200422 264 59 1 43 12 3 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200414 272 59 1 43 12 3 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200327 290 60 1 44 12 3 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200224 322 60 1 44 12 3 0 0 
  debian:buster-20200130 347 60 1 44 12 3 0 0 
Ubuntu 18.4                 
  ubuntu:bionic-20201119 53 41 1 28 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200921 112 41 1 28 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200903 130 41 1 28 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200807 157 42 1 29 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200713 182 42 1 29 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200630 195 42 1 29 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200526 230 42 1 29 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200403 283 45 1 29 12 1 0 2 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200311 306 45 1 29 12 1 0 2 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200219 327 45 1 29 12 1 0 2 
  ubuntu:bionic-20200112 365 46 1 30 12 1 0 2 
Ubuntu 16.4                 
  ubuntu:xenial-20201030 73 38 1 26 9 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20201014 89 38 1 26 9 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200916 117 38 1 26 9 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200903 130 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200807 157 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200706 189 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200619 206 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200514 242 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200326 291 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 
  ubuntu:xenial-20200212 334 39 1 26 10 1 0 1 









Vulnerabilities during container analysis 




CentOS 8                 
  centos:centos8.3.2011 34 90 5 50 33 1 0 1 
  centos:centos8.2.2004 208 98 6 48 41 2 0 1 




Types of Inspected Vulnerabilities 
  CVE CVSS3 NVD current description a CWE description b 
  CVE-2020-10878 8.6 Perl before 5.30.3 has an integer 
overflow related to mishandling of a 
"PL_regkind[OP(n)] == NOTHING" 
situation. A crafted regular 
expression could lead to malformed 
bytecode with a possibility of 
instruction injection. 
CWE-190: The software performs a 
calculation that can produce an 
integer overflow or wraparound, 
when the logic assumes that the 
resulting value will always be 
larger than the original value. This 
can introduce other weaknesses 
when the calculation is used for 
resource management or 
execution control. 
  CVE-2019-8457 9.8 SQLite3 from 3.6.0 to and including 
3.27.2 is vulnerable to heap out-of-
bound read in the rtreenode() 
function when handling invalid rtree 
tables. 
CWE-125: The software reads data 
past the end, or before the 
beginning, of the intended buffer. 
  CVE-2019-5482 9.8 Heap buffer overflow in the TFTP 
protocol handler in cURL 7.19.4 to 
7.65.3. 
CWE-120: The program copies an 
input buffer to an output buffer 
without verifying that the size of 
the input buffer is less than the 
size of the output buffer, leading 
to a buffer overflow. 
  CVE-2019-5481 9.8 Double-free vulnerability in the FTP-
kerberos code in cURL 7.52.0 to 
7.65.3. 
CWE-415: The product calls free() 
twice on the same memory 
address, potentially leading to 
modification of unexpected 
memory locations. 
  CVE-2018-17953 8.1 A incorrect variable in a SUSE 
specific patch for pam_access rule 
matching in PAM 1.3.0 in openSUSE 
Leap 15.0 and SUSE Linux Enterprise 
15 could lead to pam_access rules 
not being applied (fail open). 
CWE-284: The software does not 
restrict or incorrectly restricts 
access to a resource from an 
unauthorized actor. 
        
Note. a NVD (2021), b MITRE (2021) 
  
 
 
